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 Abstract: Public administration scholars have discerned a shift  in the federal govern-
ance context in Canada, from what was traditionally a strong, nonpartisan public 
service to a more politicized, even partisan, model of public decision-making with 
power concentrated in the upper reaches of the political executive. We explore the 
potential implications of these changes for evaluation in the federal bureaucracy. 
Our analysis, tentative at this point, suggests that in light of heightened political 
pressures, and a decline in the use of “evidence” in federal policy circles, evaluations 
may present an increasingly complex activity for public administrators to manage. 
Th ese developments raise important questions for the evaluation community about 
its relationships with public managers and its role and professional values in a 
democratic institution. 
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 Résumé : Les observateurs du domaine de l’administration publique ont constaté un 
virage dans le contexte de la gouvernance fédérale au Canada, laquelle est passée 
d’une administration publique forte, non partisane, à un modèle plus politisé, voire 
partisan, de la prise de décisions où le pouvoir est concentré dans les plus hautes 
sphères de l’exécutif fédéral. Nous explorons les impacts possibles de ces changements 
sur l’évaluation au sein de la bureaucratie fédérale. Notre analyse préliminaire sem-
ble indiquer que, au vu des pressions politiques accrues et du déclin du recours aux 
« preuves » dans les milieux politiques fédéraux, l’évaluation devient une activité de 
plus en plus complexe à gérer pour les administrateurs fédéraux. Ces développements 
soulèvent des questions importantes au sein de la communauté de l’évaluation pour 
ce qui est de ses liens avec les gestionnaires du secteur public ainsi que de son rôle et 
de ses valeurs professionnelles au sein d’une institution démocratique. 
 Mots clés : utilisation de l’évaluation, nouvelle gouvernance politique, nouvelle ges-
tion publique 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 People know what they do; they frequently know why they do what they do; but what 
they don’t know is what what they do does. (Foucault (1982) as cited in  Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1982 , p. 187) 
 As in much of the West, evaluation in Canada is a key part of the public 
governance architecture. Despite the lack of perceived benefi ts of evaluation in 
the 1960s and early 1970s ( Dobell & Zussman, 1981 ), evaluation has become 
an institution in society ( Dahler-Larsen, 2012 ), what others have termed an 
“explosion” ( Power, 1997 ). Following the rise in the 1980s of New Public Man-
agement (NPM), evaluation has responded to the need for improved effi  ciency, 
eff ectiveness, and accountability, creating a vast technocratic network focused 
on meeting the demands of public sector managers ( Norris & Kushner, 2007 ). 
Th e past 30 years have witnessed a substantial increase in evaluation, report-
ing, monitoring, inspection, and audit in all public sector organizations, led in 
part by pressure from international organizations such as the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development and other international monitoring 
agencies ( Leeuw & Furubo, 2008 ). In light of this “obsession” with evaluation 
and monitoring ( Dahler-Larsen, 2012 ), the number of evaluation associations 
has grown from 1 in the 1980s (the Canadian Evaluation Association) to over 
158 today. Th ere has also been a sizeable increase in the number of evaluation 
journals, conferences, training opportunities, and consultancies. As  Leeuw 
and Furubo (2008) keenly observe, evaluation systems spawn more evaluation 
systems. 
 Th e historical rise to prominence of evaluation in public governance in Can-
ada, along with its future status, merit refl ection in 2015, the International Year 
of Evaluation (as declared by the United Nations). Since the new millennium, 
profound changes have occurred in the governance context. Public administration 
scholars in Canada and other Anglo-American countries have been describing and 
debating some discernable shift s. At the federal level in Canada they have observed 
a concentration of power in the upper reaches of executive government ( Savoie, 
2008 ) and a more politicized tenor to the relationships between elected offi  cials 
and federal public servants ( Aucoin, 2012 ). Th is shift  is seen to signal far-reaching 
negative implications for the workings of government (of which evaluation is a key 
part), including with respect to policy making and administration, transparency 
and public access to information, the production and use of research fi ndings (or 
evidence), and democratic conventions and principles ( Aucoin, Bakvis, & Jarvis, 
2013 ;  Heintzman, 2013 ,  2014 ;  Kozolanka, 2014 ;  Turner, 2013 ). 
Inheriting an important  raison d’etre from the federal war on poverty initiated 
in the United States by Lyndon Johnson in the 1960s ( Rossi, Lipsey, & Freeman, 
2004 ), the North American evaluation community has long positioned itself in the 
role of promoting social betterment ( Henry, 2000 ;  Mark, Henry & Julnes, 2000 ) 
and providing relevant, up-to-date information to policy makers and to the public 
at large. In describing social betterment,  Henry (2000) describes 
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 [C]ollectively we must decide what are the most pressing social problems, decide 
what actions should be taken to address them, and continue to refi ne the actions 
that are taken and reengineer the organizations that are charged with achieving these 
outcomes. (p. 90) 
 While evaluation maintains deep social, cultural, and historical roots, and remains 
fully integrated and embedded in the administrative architecture, the federal gov-
ernance context in Canada is seen to be shift ing to a more politicized, increasingly 
partisan (and perhaps less democratic) focus.  Aucoin (2012) and others ( Heintz-
man & Juillet, 2012 ;  Jarvis & Bakvis, 2012 ) call this new dynamic the “New Politi-
cal Governance” (NPG), observing that it diverges from NPM in signifi cant ways. 
We argue that evaluation needs to be understood within this shift ing matrix, one 
where political considerations infused with the partisan interests of the govern-
ment of the day appear to be assuming greater prominence within the social and 
organizational context of the federal public service. 
 In this article we explore (from a conceptual point of view) the potential 
implications for evaluation of the governance trends prominent members of the 
public administration community have identifi ed, as encapsulated in the NPG 
model. What infl uences or eff ects might these trends have on evaluation and on 
the function of evaluation within government? If evaluation is fundamentally 
about social betterment, what role might evaluation be expected to play in this 
new federal context? To explore these broad questions, the article is organized into 
four parts. First, we describe the changing context and approach in public govern-
ance as a shift  from NPM to NPG. Next, we explore what the potential eff ects of 
this shift  on evaluation might look like in terms of (a) the “hyper” politicization 
of the context for evaluation, (b) the use and infl uence of evaluation in the public 
service, (c) evaluation as an institutionalized practice in federal bureaucracies, and 
(d) the infl uence of evaluation in shaping public perception and public dialogue. 
In the third section, we turn to a discussion of two possible paradoxes—or what 
 Dahler-Larsen (2012) might term “constitutive eff ects”—of evaluation in this 
transitional moment. We conclude with a brief discussion of future implications 
for evaluation practice in public sector contexts. 
 To our knowledge, the specifi c terrain of NPG explored in this article is new 
to the fi eld of evaluation. Media commentators have picked up on the trends 
encapsulated in NPG, applying them to a range of issues, such as the centraliza-
tion of power ( Jarvis & Turnbull, 2012 ), increasing partisanship ( Simpson, 2014 ), 
and government communications and advertising ( Mendes, 2014 ). We note that 
media coverage is scant in terms of evaluation and surmise this is because evalua-
tions are largely performed at program levels and are less likely to be scrutinized as 
they are deemed less relevant to system-wide concerns ( Shepherd, 2012 ). In terms 
of monitoring functions in the federal context, the parliamentary, media, and 
public focus has instead been primarily on “watchdogs” and “czars,” such as the 
Parliamentary Budget Offi  cer, the Auditor General of Canada, and the Informa-
tion Commissioner of Canada. Senior offi  cials associated with these offi  ces have 
been publicly undermined by the government of the day when they announced 
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fi ndings that contradicted those of the government or provided commentary 
or information that allowed the government’s policies or actions to be seen in a 
negative light ( Beeby, 2014 ;  Harris, 2014 ). It has been argued that the symbolic 
messages from cases such as these have resulted in the growth of a “culture of fear” 
and “self-censorship” in the public service, undermining its conventional roles 
of providing impartial advice and speaking truth to power ( Heintzman, 2014 ). 
 With respect to evaluation and NPG, we are thus on new territory. As a result, 
we approach this inquiry as a speculative exercise grounded in a spirit of explo-
ration that draws inspiration from the concepts and arguments advanced in the 
evaluation literature by those off ering sociological and critical perspectives (e.g., 
 Dahler-Larsen, 2012 ;  Power, 1997 ). What follows can, in some ways, be consid-
ered as a “foresight study” in that we are asking: What seems to be going on? What 
might happen? What might we need to do ( Giaoutzi & Sapio, 2013 )? Th e value 
in such an exercise “lies less in forecasting accuracy than in its usefulness … in 
opening minds to consider new possibilities, and thus change the policy agenda” 
( Giaoutzi & Sapio, 2013 , p. 4). We thus advance three goals: (a) begin a dialogue 
on NPG between the public administration community and the evaluation com-
munity, (b) prompt refl ection and debate in the evaluation community related to 
the federal context of evaluation, and (c) lay the groundwork for lines of inquiry 
to be pursued through empirical research in the future. 
 FROM NPM TO NPG: A CHANGING CONTEXT AND 
APPROACH IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE 
 From the early 1980s to late 1990s, public administration scholars identifi ed, ana-
lyzed, and debated a set of related reforms that came to be known as New Public 
Management (NPM) ( Hood, 1991 ;  Pollitt, 2013 ). Th e changes associated with NPM 
focused on improving responsiveness, effi  ciency, productivity, and service quality in 
the public sector ( Aucoin, 2012 ). A concern about the behaviour of public admin-
istrators also lay behind this agenda, with some observers seeing public servants as 
more interested in securing and expanding mandates and budgets for their organi-
zations than in serving the interests of citizens ( Niskanen, 1991 ;  Peters & Savoie, 
2012 ). Th ese administrative behaviours were seen to undermine both effi  ciency and 
democracy, generating two strategic countermoves on the part of elected offi  cials 
in executive government. Th e fi rst involved breaking the quasi-monopolistic roles 
public bureaucracies played in providing policy advice and delivering services. Th is 
was accomplished through such means as delayering departments, outsourcing 
delivery, using public-private partnerships, and encouraging networks for policy 
development and program coordination ( Jarvis & Th omas, 2012 ). Th e second was 
to adopt and apply private sector management principles and practices ( Aucoin, 
1990 ,  1995 ;  Hood, 1991 ;  Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004 ), including the extensive use of 
performance measurement and evaluation ( Chouinard, 2013 ). 
 Looking back, three fundamental precepts existed at the heart of NPM 
( Aucoin, 2012 ). Th e fi rst was to (re)locate the power for making public policy 
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decisions in the hands of democratically elected representatives, signalling the 
latter’s superiority in this area ( Jarvis & Bakvis, 2012 ), including with respect to 
the management reform agenda ( Peters & Savoie, 2012 ). To support this shift , 
prime ministers and presidents in Anglo-American jurisdictions increasingly 
concentrated power and resources in their offi  ces and the central agencies of 
government—a particularly prominent development in Canada ( Savoie, 2008 ). 
Th e second tenet was to give front-line public managers and their agents more 
discretion in the delivery of programs and services. Th e theory was that this 
would allow them to address “client” needs better and to seek effi  ciencies at local 
levels. Th e third precept was to ensure that managers managed well and achieved 
desired results. Th is involved increased use of performance measurement, evalu-
ation, auditing, and reporting ( Peters & Savoie, 2012 ). Th e “insistence on results 
and evaluation” ( Jarvis & Th omas, 2012 , p. 293) privileged “accountability for 
control and assurance” over “accountability for learning” ( Howard & Phillips, 
2012 , p. 322). More fi nancial and process controls were also implemented along 
with more auditing ( Hood, 2004 ;  Power, 1997 ). 
 The Emergence of “New Political Governance” 
in the Canadian Context 
 Some aspects of NPM were not embraced as enthusiastically in Canada as they 
were in other jurisdictions ( Jarvis & Th omas, 2012 ); however, the concentration 
of power and control in the offi  ce and person of the Prime Minister and cen-
tral agencies of government has featured prominently in the Canadian context 
( Savoie, 1999 ,  2008 ). Public administration scholars argue fi ve pressures in the 
governance context have motivated this change ( Aucoin, 2012 ;  Jarvis & Th omas, 
2012 ). Th ese pressures have elicited some identifi able responses on the part of 
political executives (see  Table 1 ). 
 Table 1.  NPG: Pressures in the Governance Context and the Response of 
Political Executives 
Pressures in the Governance Context Response of Political Executives
Ubiquitous media presence Expansion of communications infrastruc-
ture and centralization of power and 
control
Increased demands for transparency, 
access, openness
Tactical manoeuvring to control informa-
tion fl ows and access
Expansion of “watchdog” agencies and 
groups
Discrediting of challengers
Competition in policy marketplace Enthusiastic promotion of chosen poli-
cies
Increased volatility in the electorate Dualistic, partisan politics
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 Th e fi rst pressure point is the ubiquitous presence of an aggressive, negative 
media, including various publics using social media ( Jarvis & Bakvis, 2012 ). In 
response, the federal government’s communications infrastructure has burgeoned 
since the mid 2000s ( Kozolanka, 2014 ). Some public servants working in this area 
have been placed in situations that undermine their actual or perceived impar-
tiality ( Aucoin, 2012 ;  Kozolanka, 2014 ), while others, such as federal scientists, 
report being “muzzled” ( Chung, 2013 ) and asked to “exclude or alter information” 
in their reports ( May, 2014 ). 
 Th e second pressure is the call for increased transparency, openness, and 
public access to information. While largely seen as modern cornerstones of good 
governance, these developments have also created resource and political strains 
for governments ( Peters & Savoie, 2012 ). Anecdotal evidence suggests some 
public managers have come under increasing pressure to commit less to writing 
and to restrict what is made public ( Aucoin, 2012 ). Interference in the access 
to information process by ministerial staff  has also been reported ( Offi  ce of the 
Information Commissioner of Canada 2014 ). 
 A third strain has been the signifi cant expansion of “watchdog” agencies. In 
Canada, the public and media tend to respect and trust these agents, but actors in 
the political executive have sought to discredit them in light of partisan calcula-
tions ( Simpson, 2014 ). Not surprisingly, the release of reports from these review 
agencies is tightly scripted on both sides. 
 A fourth development has been increased competition in the policy market-
place. Th e number of lobbyists and interest groups has grown and think tanks 
have emerged, some of which have a partisan bent but remain independent of 
offi  cial parties. Ministers and their staff  call upon public servants to protect their 
interests in the face of these groups, which sometimes leads to unorthodox work 
in promoting and justifying government policy rather than discussing it in neutral 
and “purely” informative ways ( Mulgan, 2007 ). 
 Th e fi ft h political stressor is increased volatility in the electorate, which 
is less deferential to elected offi  cials, less loyal to parties, and less engaged. In 
response, political parties take polarized stances to win support and votes from 
“core” supporters. Th is dualistic politics aff ects public servants who, in serving one 
government, subsequently come to be seen as “suspect” by a diff erent incoming 
government. Some appear to deal with this dilemma by exhibiting strong—or 
“promiscuously partisan” ( Aucoin, 2012 , p. 179)—support for the policies of each 
ruling party of the day, a democratically unconventional behaviour. 
 Aucoin (2012) coined the term  New Political Governance (NPG) to describe 
changes he and others ( Savoie, 2008 ;  Heintzman & Juillet, 2012 ;  Jarvis & Bakvis, 
2012 ) discerned in political and administrative behaviours in light of these pres-
sures. NPG refl ects the ongoing concern among political leaders to reassert their 
“democratic right to govern by taking control of the state apparatus” (Aucoin, 
2008, as cited in  Jarvis & Bakvis, 2012 , p. 16). However, the governance context 
has taken on such a political character that leaders are tempted “to do whatever 
they deem necessary to stay in power” ( Aucoin, 2012 , p. 181), including tightening 
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controls over the bureaucracy to increase “responsiveness and limit politically 
damaging errors” ( Heintzman & Juillet, 2012 , p. 343). 
 Four main features characterize NPG (see  Table 2 ) as an “ideal type,” or heu-
ristic model, against which the deviance or conformity of specifi c empirical cases 
can be assessed ( Aucoin, 2012 ;  Parsons, 1964 ;  Weber, 1968 ). Th e correspondence 
of actual conduct to these features will depend on “the party in power, the prime 
minister, the state of competition between parties in the legislature and in the 
electorate, and, among other factors, the institutional and statutory constraints 
that provide checks against politicization” ( Aucoin 2012 , 179). 
 Th e fi rst feature is the tendency for elected offi  cials to engage in permanent 
electoral campaigning during their time in offi  ce, as refl ected in the heightened 
desire of political leaders to centralize power and control over decisions and 
communications. If governments are highly partisan and politicized, there is a 
higher risk of misuse of this centralized power over the public service for par-
tisan purposes ( Aucoin, 2012 ). Th e second feature is the growing number and 
power of political advisors and staff  who do the political management on behalf 
of minsters. In their zeal to serve the ruling party, these political operatives can 
fall into the trap of regarding the conventional democratic values of a nonparti-
san public service as “obstacles to overcome” ( Aucoin, 2012 , p. 186) and seek to 
co-opt public servants as political agents. Th e third feature is the temptation to 
politicize the senior ranks of the public service by appointing or promoting those 
who are seen to be “on board” with the agenda ( Aucoin, 2012 ). In addition, even 
if appointments are not overtly politicized, with the centralization of power and 
control there is more pressure on senior public servants to put the interests of the 
Prime Minister and his or her staff  above those of the public interest and their 
ministers. Th e fourth feature is that governments want public servants to be pub-
licly supportive (i.e., “enthusiastic”) about policies and to promote (rather than 
describe or explain) them to citizens and stakeholders—even in parliamentary 
committees and hearings. Th e concern here is that governments are demanding 
 Table 2.  Main Features of NPG and Related Risks to Democratic Conventions 
Main Features of NPG Related Risks to Democratic Conventions
Permanent electoral campaign Misuse of centralized power over public 
service for partisan purposes
Growing number and power of pol-
itical advisors and ministerial staff 
Coercion or co-optation of public servants as 
political agents
Politicization of senior ranks of the 
public service
Undermining of principles of merit, profes-
sionalism, and neutrality in the public service
Expectation of “enthusiastic” 
response of public servants to 
(partisan) policy
Erosion of convention of impartiality in the 
public service
8 Chouinard and Milley
© 2015 CJPE 30.1, 1–22 doi: 10.3138/cjpe.30.1.1
partisan loyalty from public servants rather than impartial loyalty as has tradition-
ally been the case. 
 Taken together, the pressures in the governance context and the NPG re-
sponses to them weaken the traditional norms of political neutrality, profes-
sionalism, and relative independence in the public service ( Heintzman, 2013 ; 
 Heintzman & Juillet, 2012 ). Jocelyne  Bourgon (2014) , former Clerk of the Privy 
Council, calls this an “institutional erosion” stemming in part from “a progressive 
de-professionalization … where a parallel political public service, comprised of 
people who are neither elected nor offi  ce-holders in the civil service, yield great 
power without accountability for the infl uence they exercise” (p. 8).  Aucoin (2012) 
goes further in arguing NPG “constitutes a corrupt form of politicization to the 
extent that governments seek to use … the public service in the administration of 
public resources and the conduct of public business to better secure … partisan 
advantage” (p. 178), observing that this change in relationships and practices has 
the potential to erode public trust in government over the long term. Th e precepts 
and idealized relationships between ministers and public servants that underpin 
NPG build on those of NPM, but also diverge in signifi cant ways as a result of 
increased power in the hands of the Prime Minister and her or his political staff  
and heightened emphasis on the political/partisan agenda. 
 In light of these changes, public administration scholars have mainly fo-
cused their attention on the eff ects of NPG on democratic conventions and 
accountability. A sustained critical gaze has not yet been cast on the potential 
implications of NPG for evaluation and on the role of evaluators in the federal 
context in Canada.  Aucoin (2012) provides a starting point, however, in argu-
ing the partisan politicization of the public service has negative eff ects on the 
performance of public managers and their organizations if, to assess NPG, one 
applies “nonpartisan criteria” (p. 178). Th is thought is suggestive of how evalu-
ation can be subject to politicization—e.g., under NPG “high performers” are 
those who enthusiastically advance political objectives and outcomes while 
abandoning a commitment of speaking truth to power ( Savoie, 2003 ). It is also 
indicative of how the “normal” political pressures that surround evaluation in 
government may be amplifi ed and endowed with partisan hues under NPG, 
potentially generating similar issues regarding mandates, terms of reference, 
methods, access to information, communication and use of fi ndings, independ-
ence, integrity, and professional values felt in other politically sensitive areas of 
government such as communications ( Kozolanka, 2014 ), science ( Chung, 2013 ; 
 Franks, 2010 ;  May, 2014 ;  Turner, 2013 ) and review agencies ( Beeby, 2014 ;  Chase, 
2013 ;  Simpson, 2014 ). 
 FROM NPM TO NPG: POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR 
EVALUATION AND FOR THE WORK OF EVALUATORS 
 Th e point that we are noting is the discernable shift  from NPM to NPG, from 
what was once a strongly democratic and nonpartisan public service to a more 
politicized and partisan model of public decision-making, may ultimately have 
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serious implications for the planning, implementation, and reception of evalua-
tion in government. In this section we discuss four such possible implications of 
this shift : (a) the “hyper” politicization of the context for evaluation, (b) evaluation 
as institutionalized and formalized practice within federal bureaucracies, (c) the 
use and infl uence of evaluation in public sector contexts, and (d) the infl uence of 
evaluation in shaping public perception and public dialogue. 
 Th e “hyper” politicization of the context of evaluation . Evaluation and politics 
have always been intimately connected ( Weiss, 1973 ), with evaluation considered 
the “handmaiden to political leadership” (Cronbach and Associates, 1980, p. 30). 
Th e increased emphasis on partisan political considerations in the federal context 
in Canada, along with the concentration of power at the centre of government, 
amplifi es and alters the relationship of evaluation and politics. Under NPM, 
the connection between evaluation and public management was formalized in 
the Treasury Board of Canada’s results-based agenda and enshrined in policies 
such as the  Management Accountability Framework ( Treasury Board Secretariat, 
1997 ) and the  Federal Accountability Act ( Treasury Board Secretariat, 2006 ), 
both of which helped establish evaluation as a key tool of public policy providing 
information on program performance and spending. Th e results-based agenda 
emphasized the  instrumental use-value of evaluation in improving program man-
agement, planning, and decision-making, and in providing a means of control 
( Everitt, 1996 ). Th is agenda also played up the  symbolic use-value of evaluation 
( Chouinard, 2013 ), as its widespread adoption signalled assurance to the public 
that the government’s political and organizational commitments were fi scally 
prudent. 
 In the “hyper” political context associated with NPG, evaluation may take 
on even more symbolic importance as a source of political legitimation ( Taylor 
& Balloch, 2005 ) and, even more importantly, potential delegitimation. In an en-
vironment of permanent electoral campaigning, “spin” ( MacDougall, 2015 ), and 
strict central control over policy and communications, political sensitivities are 
heightened throughout the public bureaucracy about how information generated 
about government policies and operations may be taken up in Parliament, the me-
dia, or the public sphere to criticize the government. Numerous cases have already 
come to light about how the production of and access to information ( Kozolanka, 
2014 ) and “evidence” ( Harris, 2014 ;  Turner, 2013 ) have been tightly circumscribed 
in the federal government since 2006, with some commentators noting this has led 
to a climate of fear ( Chase, 2013 ;  Chung, 2014 ). A prominent example has been 
the so-called “muzzling” of scientists who work for the federal government, which 
led to a “Death of Evidence” march on Parliament Hill in July of 2012 ( Turner, 
2013 ), and to 800 scientists from 32 countries publicly calling upon the govern-
ment to end its “restrictions on scientifi c communication and collaboration faced 
by Canadian government scientists” ( Chung, 2014 ). Another high-profi le example 
is how the parliamentary budget offi  cer, appointed in 2008 under the  Accountabil-
ity Act to provide nonpartisan analysis of the nation’s fi nances and government 
spending ( Harris, 2014 ), struggled unsuccessfully from 2012 to 2013 to have the 
government release details on billions of dollars of budget cuts under the  Defi cit 
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Reduction Action Plan , eventually resorting to a federal court case ( Chase, 2013 ; 
 Heintzman, 2014 ). Although these prominent cases did not specifi cally concern 
evaluation, the political and symbolic dynamics associated with them may extend 
to evaluation processes as well. Of course, this general dynamic has always been 
part of the situation for evaluation, but in an NPG context we are concerned that 
it may be amplifi ed dramatically and altered such that evaluators may fi nd the 
“politics of information and evidence” are more focused on issues regarding the 
circumscription of mandate, scope, criteria, informants, access, and reporting 
than they are about methodological selection (e.g., quantitative versus qualita-
tive data). Th e instrumental and symbolic use-value public managers placed on 
having scientifi cally rigorous evaluations under NPM may, under NPG, give way 
to concerns about how to address potential and actual political issues associated 
with the evaluation. Th e perceived demise of evidence-based practice under an 
NPG regime, coupled with more centralized political and bureaucratic decision-
making, a public service that has been labelled “promiscuously partisan,” and 
more tightly scripted public messaging, may substantially reduce the instrumental 
use-value of evaluation, as its symbolic dimension as a source of political legitima-
tion or potential delegitimation takes precedence. 
 Evaluation as institutionalized and formalized practice . Th e formal adoption 
and use of evaluation technologies within federal governance contexts, identifi ed 
as mechanisms to assist decision-making, monitoring, reporting, improvement, 
learning, and control of programs and expenditures (etc.), is prevalent. Whether 
in education, healthcare, social services, or the fi nancial sector, evaluation plays 
a legitimizing function within government. In fact, establishing the practice (and 
reputation) of evaluation is considered a key component of a well-functioning 
public service. As such, evaluation has become a key mechanism of the account-
ability movement ( Chaytor, MacDonald, & Melvin, 2002 ;  Norris & Kushner, 2007 ; 
 Schwandt, 2009 ), with evaluators acting as key agents of public accountability 
( Greene, 1999 ;  Stake, 2001 ). 
 Despite its technological and rational/logical façade and its apolitical cast, the 
current evaluation and performance management architecture within NPM and 
NPG is not neutral, as its representation extends beyond providing a mere techni-
cal solution to the current problems of public governance ( Behn, 1998 ). As  Power 
(1997) has posited, “audit is not simply a solution to a technical problem; it also 
makes possible ways of redesigning the practice of government” (p. 11). As we have 
argued previously ( Chouinard, 2013 ), the current federal architecture, intended to 
guarantee compliance with the standards of effi  ciency and eff ectiveness, imposes 
central control, as government departments become predominantly focused on 
completing detailed performance measurement and evaluation plans to satisfy 
federal accountability requirements. In eff ect, these “technologies of control” have 
created an internal system of self-monitoring and self-surveillance, creating what 
 Franklin (1990) referred to as a “culture of compliance,” and what  Foucault (1972, 
1977) might have identifi ed as a form of disciplinary power. As a key part of our 
organizational culture, evaluations (and evaluative thinking) can thus be said to 
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structure what we talk about, how we frame what we determine as important 
questions and problems, and how we defi ne possible solutions to these problems. 
As  Dahler-Larsen (2012) notes, as organizations assume cultures of evaluation, 
our thinking thus becomes more organizational, essentially more bureaucratized. 
 Th is notion of central control extends beyond the sphere of technical activi-
ties and processes associated with evaluation to include the professional norms 
and standards that frame the parameters of evaluation practice. As the Canadian 
federal evaluation and accountability policies make clear, the purpose of evaluation 
is to generate “accurate, objective and evidence-based information to help manag-
ers make sound, more eff ective decisions on their policies, projects and initiatives” 
( Treasury Board Secretariat, 2001 , Preface). Th e knowledge generated through 
evaluation thus tends to be framed in narrow, technical, and instrumental terms, 
and valued for its objectivity, predictability, and measurability. Under the current 
system of governance, knowledge claims that are associated with positivist/postpos-
itivist methodologies are given greater credence ( Henry, 2009 ;  Steiner, Wroblewski, 
& Cook, 2009 ), helping circumscribe (and essentially defi ne) what is considered 
“legitimate” (or offi  cial) knowledge. As  Norris and Kushner (2007) so aptly surmise, 
“knowledge control lies at the heart of all New Public Management projects” (p. 3). 
 Th e changing Canadian context, from a focus on building a solid architec-
ture to support the policies and practices of accountability (e.g., eff ectiveness, 
effi  ciency, and transparency) under NPM, to a more centralized and political 
platform for decision-making under NPG, may thus have profound implications 
for evaluation and for the federal bureaucracy. Under NPM, evaluation and per-
formance management are seen as key features of the governance strategy, regard-
less of whether fi ndings are used for strategic-level decisions ( Shepherd, 2012 ). 
While still a key part of the federal architecture, evaluation under NPG seems to 
be shift ing to a more symbolic role institutionally, shift ing to what  Dahler-Larsen 
(2012) has identifi ed as a “functional alternative to action” (p. 87). Th e governance 
shift  encapsulated in NPG may thus create a more tenuous link between evalu-
ation and government actions and decisions. Th e more partisan and autocratic 
the political leadership is in an NPG-like context, the more tenuous that link may 
likely become. 
 Th e use and infl uence of evaluation in public sector contexts . Despite the fact 
that utilization is one of the most studied areas in evaluation ( Christie, 2007 ), 
ever-changing and shift ing political and economic contexts and ongoing chal-
lenges related to instrumental and direct use of fi ndings ensure its endurance as 
a relevant area of concern. Th e notion of utilization remains central to evaluation 
( Vedung, 1999 ). Th e evaluation literature identifi es a range and taxonomy of use 
(e.g., direct or instrumental use, conceptual use or enlightenment, political or 
symbolic use; see  Patton, 1988 ;  Weiss, 1998 ), with an emphasis on how evaluation 
can contribute to learning, capacity building, organizational development, em-
powerment, process use, and so on. Despite the myriad conceptualizations of use 
currently discussed and debated in the fi eld, the value of evaluation nonetheless 
continues to be related to the expectation that evaluation results will in some way 
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directly inform the policy and the decision-making process ( Weiss, 1999 ). Para-
doxically, the increase in the demand for evaluation does not seem to have led to 
increased utilization, leading  Dahler-Larsen (2012) to identify this phenomenon 
as one of the “mysteries” of the evaluation wave. Th is “mystery” is not relegated to 
the use of evaluation fi ndings alone, as under NPG we also note the disuse or mis-
use of science and social science (so-called “evidence”) within government as well 
( Prewitt et al., 2012 ;  Turner, 2013 ). Given the politicization of decision-making 
within the federal government under NPG, evaluation use (and the use of social 
science research more generally), is becoming far more complex. As  Weiss (1999) 
has cautioned, the more democratic the system, the more likely that evaluation 
results will be used, while authoritarian systems tend to “hold power close to the 
chest and fewer people are allowed into its inner sanctum” (p. 480). 
 While we previously noted the role of evaluation within the current federal 
system as largely symbolic ( Chouinard, 2013 ), the institutionalization of evalu-
ation within the federal bureaucracy is ensuring that its impact will extend be-
yond the symbolic, to infl uence how we work and how we think about our work 
( Dahler-Larsen, 2012 ). In many ways, the utilization issue has moved beyond 
whether evaluation results are being used, to encompass the more subtle (and yet 
more far-reaching) impact of the institutionalization of evaluation within federal 
bureaucracies. Although evaluation has always been understood as a cultural, 
social, and political expression embedded in and intrinsically tied to particu-
lar social and institutional structures and practices ( House & Howe, 2000 ), the 
shift ing context from NPM to NPG seems to emphasize for us the fundamental 
transformation in conceptualizations of evaluation use. 
 If, under NPM, evaluation has played an important symbolic role with respect 
to accountability, over time it has also changed what public managers work on and 
how they perceive and go about their work. Th e institutionalization of evaluation 
suggests progress has been made in promulgating evaluative thinking among 
public managers, a longstanding goal of the evaluation community. But, in a more 
profound sense, it signals how public managers have been encouraged to internal-
ize the discipline of evaluation (e.g., planning, monitoring, and course correction 
in light of external direction and standards) as part of their legitimate participation 
in the broader “culture of compliance” in the public service. Th e arrival of NPG 
may further entrench this dynamic and amplify its political and partisan dimen-
sions, as public managers likely know “full well” that the central agencies and the 
Prime Minister’s Offi  ce have them on “constant watch to protect the government’s 
political interests” while having the authority and resources “to intervene to set 
things right” ( Peters & Savoie, 2012 , p. 34). Th is suggests the goal the evaluation 
community has pursued to push public managers to learn conceptually may be 
overtaken under NPG by a steep learning curve with respect to politics. Th is may 
be particularly true for senior civil servants who “are now doing many things that 
political assistants used to do in the past” ( Bourgault, 2013 , p. 171). 
 Under NPG, the symbolic dimension and use of evaluation may well be more 
pronounced. On a landscape where the promise for the use of fi ndings seems 
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dim because the desire for “immediate political advantage” casts “long shadows 
over hard data and reasoned analysis” ( Turner, 2013 , p. 17), evaluation processes 
and results may increasingly be subject to tight scripting by overinvolved public 
managers in service to the senior ranks of the public service. Th e politicization 
of the process may ensure that we move to a focus on the performative nature of 
public management rather than a focus on government performance, a shift  in the 
metaphor for evaluation from a technical, methodological focus to representing 
the imagery of performance and dramaturgy. 
 Th e infl uence of evaluation in shaping public perception and public dialogue . 
Th inking of evaluation as a form of “assisted sense making” ( Mark, Henry, & 
Julnes, 2000 ) draws attention to the fact that evaluation is not merely a technical 
activity, but one that has the potential to enhance our understanding of a pro-
gram, process, policy, or practice. Th e sense-making concept also contributes to 
our aspirations for evaluation, to its role and function in democratic communi-
ties linked to “social betterment,” to the utility and use of evaluation, and to the 
shaping of our concepts and measures as they relate to the parameters of pro-
gram understanding. In many ways, evaluation has become a fundamental part 
of our public policy model and culture ( Dahler-Larsen, 2012 ), as it helps frame 
our understanding of public programs in terms of how they are defi ned, how 
they work, and how they can be made more eff ective and effi  cient. Th e current 
focus of evaluation on measures of effi  ciency, eff ectiveness, and value for money 
(as defi ned within a Canadian context) shapes our understanding of programs 
and possibilities, ultimately shaping the parameters of public expectation, dia-
logue, and discourse in ways that give the illusion of democratic accountability 
( Schwandt, 2009 ). 
 Historically there has always been a strong link between evaluation and the 
machinery of government, with evaluation serving an instrumental role designed 
to assist with managerial decision-making and program improvement ( House, 
1993 ). Under NPM, and as the current Canadian public governance model well 
illustrates, evaluation has evolved to an accountability or largely symbolic func-
tion used to legitimize government activities ( Chouinard, 2013 ;  Norris & Kushner, 
2007 ;  Schwandt, 2009 ). Th e noted shift  to NPG, highlighted by tight control of 
information and communication, along with an increase in the number of un-
elected political staff  within public bureaucracy, may mean that public dialogue 
and discussion around public programs and government spending priorities will 
remain tightly scripted and highly controlled. 
 POTENTIAL PARADOXES (OR “CONSTITUTIVE EFFECTS”) 
PRODUCED WITHIN SHIFT FROM NPM TO NPG: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION 
 Th is article highlights the complexity of social, political, and institutional forces 
involved in knowledge and policy formation, as well as the role of diverse ac-
tors and systems implicated in producing diff erent types of knowledge for the 
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management of the public good. As  Weiss (1999) makes so abundantly clear, the 
creation and construction of policy is never straightforward, particularly given 
that the policy-making arena is characterized by an array of diff erent and oft en 
competing agendas and political interests about what is required and how best 
to organize and allocate existing resources. Evaluation fi ndings (and data from 
the social sciences more generally) provide merely one construction amidst a 
cacophony of other competing interests and alternative constructions available. 
Understanding the relationship between evaluation, utilization, and public policy 
is therefore complex and, as our analysis has thus far highlighted, contains nu-
merous contradictory or paradoxical dynamics and tensions. In using NPG as a 
heuristic model with which to explore contemporary dynamics in public govern-
ance, we identify two potential paradoxes with respect to the work of evaluators 
and with respect to the function of evaluation more generally: the paradox of use 
and the paradox of accountability. 
 We use the term  paradox , which the  Oxford Dictionary identifi es as a self-
contradictory proposition and a senseless or logically unacceptable conclusion, 
as a way to problematize the push-pull dynamics and tensions that may exist for 
evaluators and for evaluation under NPG-like conditions. Our use of the term 
paradox is intended to illustrate the embeddedness of these tensions or contradic-
tions within the very processes and outcomes of public governance, what  Dahler-
Larsen (2012) might refer to as “constitutive eff ects.” Th e important point to keep 
in mind is that constitutive eff ects describe the eff ect of evaluation systems on 
constructing a particular social reality (e.g., while we use tests to measure student 
learning, the testing itself changes what is taught, how it is taught, and ultimately 
what students learn). Th e following discussion is thus intended to describe the 
potential paradoxes and constitutive eff ects of evaluation during the key transi-
tional moment from NPM to NPG. 
 Th e paradox of use refers to the fact that, despite the discourse surrounding 
evidence-based practice and evidence-based decision-making, the actual use of 
evidence seems to be in decline, while the infrastructure surrounding evaluation 
(what we have referred to as the evaluation industry) seems to be on the rise. In 
fact, evaluation is woven into the very fabric of public governance and concomi-
tantly forms an obligatory component of virtually all aspects of policy, service 
delivery, and management processes—from micro to macro levels. Yet, arguably, 
evaluation use within public sector discourse and decision-making seems to be 
on a downward trend. If this is true, what are the implications of this paradox for 
evaluation and for evaluators? 
 From our perspective, the most profound eff ect of the paradox of use might 
be the potential infl uence on the learning and pedagogical function of evalua-
tion. Although evaluation has traditionally been conceptualized as a pedagogical 
undertaking ( Schwandt, 2003 ), under NPG its use may well be reduced to a per-
formative function (almost a political dramaturgy) that fundamentally changes 
not only what we learn but also how we learn it. Th e distinction here is between 
evaluation as a “technical undertaking” intended as a set of tools designed to 
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improve practice and generate answers, and evaluation as a conceptual practice 
intended to generate dialogue and facilitate learning ( Schwandt, 2003 ). Learning 
would then be focused on tracking and measuring performance and progress 
against stated goals, rather than as an educative instrument for capacity building 
and dialogue. Over time, the paradox of use likely shift s to a “performance para-
dox,” as the connection between performance indicators and performance itself 
becomes weaker ( van Th iel & Leeuw, 2002 ). 
 Th e paradox of accountability refers to the inclusion of evaluation as a 
core component of the democratic and management accountability discourses 
( Chaytor et al., 2002 ;  Schwandt, 2009 ), where it is seen to provide “assurance” 
about results (primarily) and processes (secondarily), while in practice it seems 
to remain largely unclear who is accountable to whom and for what. Although 
few would dispute the importance of accountability in public governance, what 
it means in theory and practice remains vague.  Charlton (2002) describes 
accountability as a “slippery rhetorical term” (p. 3) containing two distinct, 
interchangeable meanings: one related to technical management processes and 
the other to democratic accountability.  Aucoin and Jarvis (2005) argue it is 
the latter form of accountability that seems particularly elusive, despite being 
a mainspring of good governance.  Heintzman & Juillet (2012) point out ten-
sions that exist with respect to democratic accountability at the interface of the 
political executive and public administration, all of which may become more 
problematic with the emergence of NPG. Of particular concern is a weaken-
ing of the “key tenets of traditional regimes, such as the political neutrality, 
professionalism, and relative independence of the public service” ( Heintzman 
& Juillet, 2012 , p. 344). 
 As discussed earlier, evaluation under NPM was positioned as a technical in-
strument positioned to provide assurance that public managers managed well and 
to provide a means for controlling and altering their behaviours. It was also seen 
to support democratic accountability by helping elected offi  cials to wrest control 
for policy and decisions away from bureaucrats and providing evidence to Par-
liament and the public about the eff ectiveness of policy and its implementation. 
Th ese aspirational goals were not fully realized in practice, but they nonetheless 
helped evaluation rise to institutional prominence. 
 Our analysis thus far suggests that under NPG the symbolic use of evalu-
ation may come to the fore, and the control and disciplining function it pro-
vides in the public administration will have a more pronounced political (and 
potentially partisan) fl avour. Evaluation may present a more complex problem 
for public administrators to manage under NPG than it did under NPM, as 
it would seem to be much more than a technical process aimed at generating 
information about management performance; rather, it may become a po-
litical concern that cuts straight to the heart of democratic conventions. Th is 
potential shift  raises important questions for the evaluation community about 
its relationships with public managers and its role and professional values in a 
democratic institution. 
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 CONCLUDING NOTES AND AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 To this day, the boom in evaluation continues, even as its ability to realize its 
ambitions (providing evidence to inform decisions, supporting learning pro-
cesses, bolstering democratic and management accountability, helping improve 
effi  ciency and eff ectiveness) seems remote. In this article we highlighted the shift  
from a public sector governance model based on the principles of NPM to those 
of NPG, with a focus on the potential implications of this shift  for evaluation (and 
the role of evaluation) within a changing federal bureaucracy. While evaluation 
continues to be a key part of public governance, the politicization of federal policy 
and decision-making, coupled with a decline in the use of “evidence” in federal 
policy circles, suggests the performative, dramaturgical aspect of evaluation may 
take precedence over the more direct use of fi ndings. Th e institutionalization of 
evaluation within the federal bureaucracy also highlights its disciplinary, self-
monitoring function, as federal decisions are increasingly made beyond the range 
of the federal bureaucracy, and ultimately beyond the conventional parameters of 
our democratic structures. 
 In this article we argued that evaluation, as a form of assisted sense-making 
and fundamentally related to raising issues and questions of social betterment, is 
now at risk. In an important sense, we may be witnessing a shift  in governments’ 
perspectives on the main purposes of evaluation along  MacDonald’s (1974) typol-
ogy, from aspirations for democratic aims of “social betterment” in the 1970s, to 
bureaucratic utility and functions of government under NPM in the 1980s and 
1990s, to the emergence of autocratic expressions in the 2000s, as signalled by a 
more politicized, potentially less neutral or nonpartisan, public service. As evalu-
ation seems to be increasingly positioned as part of the tightly scripted political 
drama (a “reality series”?) that unfolds inside and outside the public service, we 
have to ask: If evaluation is fundamentally about social betterment, what role can 
it be expected to play within this new federal context? What role can evaluators 
working within public sector institutions be expected to play? Perhaps being 
aware of the shift ing context within the federal bureaucracy may enable evaluators 
to become more politically savvy in their engagement in a process that has become 
so much more politicized, a process whose connections to social betterment we 
argue may well be at risk. 
 As we noted, this article is intended as a “foresight study,” as a way to generate 
dialogue among the evaluation community (and perhaps between the evaluation 
community and the public administration community), and as a speculative piece 
to prompt refl ection on the shift ing context for evaluation within the federal bu-
reaucracy. In our minds, this article lays the conceptual groundwork for future 
empirical research that we propose to explore the potential eff ects of the shift ing 
context (from NPM to NPG) on the function and use of evaluation within the 
federal bureaucracy. What discernable changes can be identifi ed to describe the 
shift ing context for evaluation? How is evaluation currently perceived, and how 
is it being used? What is the relationship between evaluation and departmental 
decision-making? Our goal in pursuing empirical research at this time is to 
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identify current evaluation practices and emergent patterns of use within what 
we have noted is a shift ing, more politicized federal context. 
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